Introduction
This essay deals with the problem of the relation between ritual behaviour and environmental conditions in an African rural society. Many studies in anthropology/ethnology have been devoted to the inter-relationship of thèse two sphères, especially by proponents of the 'ecological anthropology'-school, but also by those favouring a more social-structural, symbolic or cognitive approach to ritual life. The présent study will try to intégrale thé 'ideational' and thé material-environmental éléments, in order to explain how meaning in ritual is constituted in the dialectic between human action and environmental conditions.
For this purpose, a text of the mósit, a central ritual of the Me'en people, a lesser-known group of South-East Surmic (Nilo-Saharan) speakers in Southwestern Ethiopia 1 will be presented and discussed. It will be analysed as part of thé action structure of the ritual as a whole, placed in its cultural context.
The Me'en people hâve only had marginal contacts with (Ethiopian Orthodox) Christianity (none with organized Islam) and provide an interesting and perhaps amazing example of how a 'traditional' local religion has maintained itself. They live in a relatively remote région of Africa, where thé cultural effects of 'globalisation' and political-economic and cultural incorporation into state or wider institutional structures-often seen as already being universal in thé T'hird World-are still marginal.
In thé following analysis of thé ritual, I will look at the significance of environmental referents in thé ritual acts and words, and at how the language and the context of the mósit reflect social and reproductive relations within Me'en society. The fïrst point account of religieus ritual, not all aspects of which can be said to have an 'explanatory' dimension referring to empirical reality (cf. Lawson & McCauley 1990: 36-37, 156) . A broader conception of the cognitive process, denoting formal, psychologically-rooted mechanisms of humans to produce and process représentation, defines the pattern of religious behaviour in conjunction with the religious conceptual System, and tries to trace its workings as part of an overall meaningful pattern generaled by actions following certain predictable formal procedures. Ritual acts are taken as the basic building bloes, which reveal generative patterns. This approach has been offered by Lawson & McCauley, who have developed their challenging theory of religious ritual compétence in analogy to the theory of language compétence (Lawson & McCauley 1990: 77) . A central part of their theory is, therefore, the analytic description of ritual acts. The acts have action structures. Explicating their conditions and their structural character yields an explanatory description of religious ritual (cf. Lawson & McCauley 1990: 85, 121, 174-175) . The claim in this article is not to exhaustively explain the Me'en world-view but to sketch the basic conditions for this, elucidating its structure and cultural context and indicating some of the dominant concerns which inform the spécifie relationship which these people entertain with their environment.
Delineating Eitual
As we know, a comprehensive description or définition of the phenomenon of 'ritual' is not easy to give, nor is it fruitful to elaborate at length on the definitional problem. When studying ritual in non-literate, small-scale rural societies such as the Me'en, it is often striking that there is usually no spécifie word for 'ritual' or 'ritual activity'. This does not prevent outside observers from quickly recognizing it, however. As Lewis (1980: 6) says: '... sometimes we feel almost sure that something is ritual before we know or can think of any meaning for it.' What is the reason for this? Is it the bias of observers from a literate, hierarchical society where rituals-especially collective, society-wide rituals-have been declining or have lost their 'credibility', a fact which makes them note ritual behaviour in other, presumably more integrated societies? Part of the answer may be that rituals in a small-scale These conditions suggest that ritual, in a descriptive sensé, is a staged social performance with répétitive acts and formulas appealing to central tenets or 'commitments' of the culture within which it is recognized. The emotionally evocative aspect of ritual has been emphasized in several théories of ritual and is indeed present by virtue of its dramatic form. But the évocation of émotion or sentiments is not a purpose of ritual per se. In line with our cognitive approach to ritual, we see thé emotional appeal of ritual as a by-product, not an end in itself, of thé human effort to render thé world meaningful or manageable.
In many définitions of ritual (e.g. Rappaport's 1979b: 28) , a référence to thé ' supernatural' is included. While assumptions about non-human or super-human agents are usually relevant, this concept of supernatural as opposed to the natura! of the human may not always be necessary. Guthrie (1980: 185) has noted that thé 'supernatural' is a western folk category, resulting from thé humans-nature opposition found in thé Gréco-Christian tradition, and it may already reflect a particular assumption concerning thé relationship between humans and the 'environment'. If applied without reflection, one may miss thé spécifie conception of this relationship in thé culture under study. This relationship has to be clarified first before one can assess its practical implications or its possibilities for change. Lawson & McCauley (1990: 7) , however, speak of religious ritual as a part of a wider religious conceptual System whereby assumptions about 'culturally postulated superhuman agents' are always important: such assumptions indeed differentiate religion from any other Systems of belief.
Humans and Nature: Context of the Mósit Ritual
The Environment and Its 'Perception ' Important to note is that the relation between humans and nature should not be seen dualistically. T. Ingold (1993: 40) , in his brief but excellent article on culture and environment, pleads for a 'mutualistic' view: in thé course of their practical activities in relation to their environment, people acquire a direct (practical) knowledge of it, without first 'constructing' or fully understanding or knowing it in ail implications (ibid.: 52). Perception of the environment (by animais as well as humans) is not prior to utilizing it.
The environment is immediately apprèhended or s inte f rpreted in the course of life activities (and thus not"reaïly to be'<seen as separate or opposed). It is seen by humans in terms of what it affords them in relation to the activities in which they are engaged.
While this view of 'affordances' of the environment is éxtfemely useful for a sound theory of the relation between humans and environment and as an antidote to an in many ways spent 'cultural constructivist' approach, one aspect remains a bit understated in Ingold's analysis: that of humans entering into planned, long-term engagement with the environment. The manner of engagement will over time become part of collective human behaviour enhancing the chances of humans in that same life process, and is a manner which will become 'culture'. Religious ritual is one of the cultural mechanisms by which this is achieved. 2 As will become clear, these arguments are relevant in considering the mósit ritual, which is a seasonal ritual held just before the main harvest and consumption of the staple crops maize or sorghum. By enacting it, the Me'en express an intimate relation with their environment and with the inanimate and animate beings which they have to deal with. Doing the ritual, one might say, is part of how they utilize the environment, or of how they engage it (cf. Ingold 1993: 44) .
The Me 'en The Tishana-Me'en people (numbering ca. 50,000 in 1991) are a group of 'tribal' cultivators in the Southwest of Käfa Region, in a fairly isolated area of Ethiopia They have often been qualified as 'Nilotic' people, but while they hâve some cultural practices fitting the 'Nilotic' profile of e.g. Nuer or Dinka, this epithet is misleading. They neither hâve a Nilotic language nor a predominantly pastoral way of life. The Tishana-Me'en practice shifting cultivation (maize, sorghum, some teff, barley, lentils and beans), animal husbandry, and do some hunting and gathering. 3 In the late 19th and early 20th Century, they were more of a cattleherding people. Nowadays, they are mostly cultivators, but their mobility is gréât. Fields are changed very frequently, and thé location of homesteads every year changes accordingly, although one often remains within thé confines of a (shifting) ancestral clan territory. There are no Me'en villages. Trade is not significant: the Me'en produce no big export crops except some coffee, bought up by non-Me'en traders for transport to regional market centers like Mizan Täfari or Jimma. The level of technology and environmental control is low. Their région is not well-integrated into thé wider Ethiopian society. Labour migration by Me'en is virtually nonexistent. There are no public facilities, like transportation, agricultural extension programs, credit facilities, shops, nor even welldeveloped regional markets in the area. There is only a handful of primary schools. Knowledge of Amharic or any other Ethiopian language besides their own Me'en language is limited. Only on the northern and southern fringes of the Me'en area, where (Omoticspeaking) Bench and Dizi people are found respectively, the Me'en also speak the language of the neighbouring group. Their economy is pre'dominantly geared to subsistence. Apart from the proceeds from coffee sales, occasional cash money is only found by selling livestock or honey in the five kätämas located in the Me'en area (i.e., the original settler-villages founded by northerners in the early years of this Century). Agricultural work in the corn and sorghum fields is mostly collective: work-teams composed of relatives and neighbours clear, burn off and (sometimes) weed the fields, and haul in the erop at harvest time. The sorghum or maize beer (sholu) distributed at collective work-parties is prepared by women. During the growing of the crops, women are responsible for the fields, and also for the gardens near the homesteads, and for petty trade of foodstuff, milk or local beer. They may own some small stock or cattle, but less than the men. The socio-economic and kinship rôle of women is in many ways central to Me'en social life, although they do not figure in leading public rôles such as komorut, acting clan/lineage head, raider, or diviner.
Me'en social structure is segmented. People are usually identified by membership in nominal patrilineal lineage-or 'clan'-groups. Community leaders are the elders, especially those from certain old clans. The former 'rain chiefs' (komorut) of the Me'en have lost most of their influence, though they are still important as mediators, e.g. in homicide compensation settlements.
The impact of the state-socialist policies of the former MarxistLeninist government of Ethiopia (1975 Ethiopia ( -1991 has not been bénéfi-ciai, either politically, or economically or culturally. Traditional religieus and ritual beliefs and practices were devalued, discouraged and sometimes prohibited, and much ritual property was confiscated or destroyed outright. The worst effects were feit during the violent students' zämächa campaign , but continued also after that. Many young people were forcibly drafted into the national arniy to fight in the civil war in the north and did not return.
In the days when the Me'en were still predominantly agropastoralists in the Shorum and Omo River valleys (in the mid-19th Century; cf. Abbink 1990) , their main erop was sorghum. Nowa,days, in the highland setting, it is maize. Compared to sorghum, maize perhaps gives a larger yield per unit of cultivated land and labour input. It is also rauch preferred by thé Me'en for its sweeter taste. But once stored, it is probably more vulnérable to varions insect pests (e.g., weevils) and to rats than sorghum. Duririg its growth on thé fields, maize may not run more risks from animal pests than sorghum, but it is much less drought-résistant. Sorghum thus remains an indispensible food crop. In former times, thé Me'en performed their main mosit ceremony (described by Tippett 1970: 89f . as a 'fïrst fruit ceremony') for sorghum, as it is still donc by thé Bodi-Me'en and by thé agro-pastoral Suri people west of Maji, a group with notable historica! and linguistic affinities with thé Me'en. Today, the Tishana-Me'en (living mainly in an intermediate highland zone, between c. 1100 and 1800 m.) hold the ceremony predominantly for maize, because it is by far their most important staple crop, and, as said, is seen as vulnérable. If thé maize-crop fails, there is hunger in thé Me'en area, and external aid in such a case is rare.
The Wider Religions Conceptual System of the Me'en
As Lawson & McCauley noted (1990: 7, 87) , religious ritual must be viewed in its connection with thé religious conceptual scheme of which it is a logical part. A System of représentations in thé conceptual sphère is reflected in ritual action. The Me'en religious conceptual system is perhaps not elaborate but has several connected domains: a) belief in the Sky-God Tuma, who is the source of rain, fertility, growth and cosmic order; b) belief in the présence or importance of lineage and ancestors, often collectively referred to as k'alua, the 'spirit' of the descent line of a person which may manifest itself in dreams; c) the local spirits or forces, called k'olle; and d) recourse to spirit-possession and healing, by specialists called men-de-nyerey. As especially the last part (spirit possession) is demonstrably a more recent (early and mid-twentieth Century) accretion to the religieus system of the Me'en, it is not always clear, either to observers or to Me'en themselves, in what way the various domains interlock or are mutually interdependent in a conceptual sense. It may be said that the first two points form the 'core' of the Me'en world-view, but the latter two parts are pragmatically being integrated into it. 4 There is no cuit of the creator-god (Tuma)-in line with many other African 'tribal' religions-and neither one of the 'ancestors': sacrifices or offerings are not made to them. They are appealed to, and may be seen as 'agents' whose influence can be feit at critical moments. But they are otherwise not held to be much involved in day-to-day life. A fifth domain which might possibly be considered one of religious or superhuman character is that of divination and magie, done in a variety of ways by certain experts (see e.g. Abbink 1993) : entrail-reading, divination of water patterns on cattle-skin, and of bird sounds and movements. But neither here is a connection with Tuma or the 'ancestors' established. As in religious activities, a concern with solving practical and daily problems within the context of the wider community and environment stands central, but divination can only be marginally considered as part of the religious conceptual system; for example in divination on the basis of animal entrails, there is no offering to or invocation of God or ancestors.
Finally, it may be important to note that in this society of segmented groups and hereditary ritual 'chiefs', religious ritual life is not an arena for political power struggles. 5 
Place of the Mósit Rituals in the Religious Conceptual System
The mósits are important in that they represent one of the few full-scale, annually held, group ceremonies in Me'en society. Mósit is actually the term used for various rituals performed by Me'en.The word itself literally refers to 'fire-making with wooden sticks', one twirled around in the other to produce smouldering ashes caught in fine grass, which are then blown into a fire. The act of producing the fire is hak-mósit, i.e. the 'hitting of the fïre-sticks'. The control and use of fire (guo) is of course a crucial element in this shifting-cultivator society: for burning the fields, and for préparation of nearly all food. It is also an icon for the peaceful homestead, with a fire-place (bakuf) in thé centre. One migration myth of the Tishana-Me'en tells of the near loss of fire when they crossed thé P'ada River (i.e., thé Omo) and its last-minute recovery by a dog, who swam back to the 'homeland' across the river, lighted his tail, and then gave thé fire to thé migrants. In the past, the Me'en more commonly held mósits for cattle, for thé honey 'harvest' from their beehives, and even for (or better, against) malaria. This already suggests that thé ritual may hâve to do with protection, with ensuring a bénéficiai development of the beings for which thé fire and its smoke are made. Also, according to informants, thé completion of thé ritual signified that ail people could start to harvest and consume the new erop. In the religious structure of thé Me'en as a whole the mósits are undoubtedly a central element. Rituals of this kind are present among other East African agro-pastoral groups, but hâve so far not really been described or considered in their wider religious context. 6 In thé ritual of the mósit, there is a connection with thé powers of the Sky-God Tuma, and of the lineage spirits or 'ancestors', though it does not seem to be prédominant in the text and the acts to be presented below. The connection with thé Sky-God may well have been the original religious referent of the mósit, but has been obscured by the emphasis on divination and magie, and on the clan and lineage ancestors, a result of the 'localization' of these groups: there is a tendency to become more sedentary in the wake of an emerging specialization in cultivation, by population growth, and by more dependency on relations with neighbouring groups like the Bench and Dizi.
The mósit, however, still is a core ritual, epitomizing the Me'en way of life in a socio-economic and religious sense. This becomes clear in considering the spatial, social, seasonal and ideological aspects of its setting. In what follows, a first overview of the Me'en mo«V-ritual will be given and its structure analysed. lts place in the larger scheme of Me'en religious ideas will be clarified.
The Setting
The setting for the ritual comprises objects, participants and a chosen place and time. a) Objects. Every Me'en mósit requires a set of ritual paraphernalia in order to be carried out properly: (sàliche-tikây, bunt'ula) .
These natura! objects are essential for any complete mósit-ritual, and gréât pains are taken, days in advance, to collect them and bring them to the place of the ceremony. All plant materials as well as the black stone come from the lowland area (kom*) near the Shorum River. Sometimes, a substitute can be used for plants: e.g. for chubulukuni one may take the round fruit (called burâcK) of the Oncoba spinosa tree, also a tough lowland species. These various plants (except the tulmit) are seen as having 'power' above that of other plants. Coffee (made from the leaves) always was ritual drink among the Me'en, and not drunk daily. b) Participants. There are four main 'actors' staging the ritual, who are elder members of three or four different Me'en 'clans '. 7 They are divided in two pairs of a male and a female partner 8 although the actual sex of the actors usually is male. The partners of each pair stand in a relationship of 'kokó' to each other. This means that they are each other's 'ritual assistants', coming from opposing, marriageable clan-groups. One of these four officiating people has to be a member of an old Me'en-tAzm ( = 'defmitely' or 'real' Me'en) clan, i.e. one recognized by the Me'en as an 'ancestor-clan' (of which there are said to be twelve). This person bears the responsibility for the whole ceremony and by his présence guarantees that it will pass off in the proper manner. The members of these groups coming together for the ceremony are living in the same area, and have their fields for maize or sorghum in each other's vicinity. In the mósit to be described, the four actors came from the Ganguo (Gelit), Degit, Mo'ach and Selakoroy clans. The
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Selakoroy man was the main responsable person. He had to guarantee that the ritual objects were present (some of them to be brought by his kokos), and he also initiated the words spoken during the ceremony. c) Place and time. The mósit is always held in an open space between the fields, 'so that the smoke of the fire can pass over the crops.' Fields not reached are 'smoked' later with fire taken from the main fire made with the tulmtt-sticks. The ritual is always held just before the crops are to be harvested, usually one night before the new moon appears in June or July (i.e., approximately the final 'months' of the Me'en yearly cycle). The exact day is often determined by a sign in a dream of a leading member of a Me'en-chzm clan. The first ripe ears of sorghum, or cobs of corn, are brought to be used in the ritual. An average mósit takes about one-and-a-half hours It should be noted that the ceremony described here was the last and major one in a series of three. In the month preceding the harvest, the mósit is always done three times for the same group, although in the fint two ceremonies, the erop is not symbolically eaten by the participants-only the fire is made and the four main participants are 'painted' with the clay-and-water mixture (see below)
Texts and Acts of the MLósit-Ritual
The following text from a Me'en mósit-ritual has the character of a long invocation in the subjunctive mood, in the style of a 'prayer' (cf. also Turner 1977) It reflects an underlying concern of this shifting-cultivator people with the need for an understanding or harrnony between man and nature. The text is not really a 'liturgical order' (in terms of Rappaport's description of this, see Rappaport 1979: 176, 192) , and does not have its 'invariance' (tbid ). The words of a mósit are improvised at every different occasion, although the gist of the 'message' evoked by it is always similar to that of the text presented here. The text, however, is geared to the ritual actions, which form the core of the mósit. What is said, is a commentary on what is done, and in this sense text and acts together are performative This text was transcribed from a tape made at a mósit for sorghum, in Duma k'ebele ( = locality), in the former Goldiya district (now Maji zone) of the Käfa Region. 9 The Duma area is solidly populated by Me'en. 10 The main speaker is B'olley, the Selakoroy person. His 'respondent' is Mängäsha, his kokó and a member of the Ganguo lineage (part of the Gelit clan). The main action séquences are numbered. 1. The mósit starts when all four 'actors' are seated together on a cow-hide, in front of the ritual objects. The fïrst thing donc is the production of fïre with thé tulmit-sticks. B'olley made the fïrst twisting movement; the three others then followed, each placing their hands on the upper part of the drilling stick, moving and turning it downwards. During this drilling action, the following words were said: At this moment they were still struggling with the fire -it always takes some time to produce it. The purpose is not to make it as fast as possible.
B'olley:
Kègit kok-gashak, liba kègtu, amda kudo! 18 Let the wild animais get lost, let the sorghum ripen, let the crops come forth! Kègit kabara-kesech whole-chekara. Choba kabar-ne kaasa, 19 choba chekara.
Let the eyes of the wild animais be hurt and lost, let it reach and hurt the eyes of the hog, let the hog be wiped out.
19
Dukit kogu, dukit kogue kun kat, koban gashak. 20 Let disease 20 go, let it be weakened from the roots, and be thrown out. Amda kèkgidu, zuo katala bi, choba kok-gashak. 21 Let the crops be ripe, let people acquire cattle, let the hog go to the forest.
2. Hereafter, the wood-crumbs from the sticks were glowing and were caught on the blade of a knife. Then they were carefully wrapped in the baboon-grass, which was blown into a small fire. With this, the big fire was built, with other grass and dry wood. 3. W hen the fire was burning, B'olley took the three other plants lying near him (latech, jakach and chubulukunt) and bundled them together with a few ripe ears of sorghum taken from a nearby field. 4. Then, from another ear of sorghum, brought for this purpose also from a nearby field, a worm was taken. Certain worm species are a familiär pest of young and ripening grain. B'olley folded the worm into leaves taken from the three plant species and cursed it with the words 'Dungk'it kokd'ok!' 22 (i.e., 'Let the worm be wiped out'), words repeated by the three other elders present. Then they continued as follows. 5. At this point, the four actors each took a bite from the bündle of plants and spat it out over the fire.
B'olley:
Amda kègit kororogna mokache kabalshi t'ila, 25 Let the crops ripen well and let the women prépare food, amo t'ila ki-fffenge, libache kèkna ki tuma tunto, 26 let the food be eaten and be in our stomach, let the sorghum grow and reach up to the sky.
kègit geiya ba-dia tegna, kuda meta-ya kanggage tugun gashako
When we chase the wild animais away from this place, they return soon, those baboons running in the forest. 6. In the meantime, a quantity of sorghum stalks was brought by boys and put down near the fire. Also corn-cobs had been brought in a basket, to be blessed by the four elders. Finally, a gourd of b'untila (coffee brewed from coffee-leaves and spices, prepared by women of the nearby homestead) was brought to be used for the blessing.
B'olley:
Amda kègtu, amda kègtu, achuk kugo, zuo ga badia, 30 Let the crops be ripe, let the crops be ripe, let meat come, the people are here. dungk'itia kokd 'ok, zuo kamat-sholuna k'udutna, kidacha. 31 Let the worms get lost, let the people drink beer, be satiated 24 , and live quietly. Amda kègtu! 32 Let the crops be ripe! When this was said, the four elders continued the spray-blessing with coffee and chewed plant-leaves over the fire. 7. When they finished, the women roasted the sorghum in the fire for a few minutes. Then the rest of the people present came forward, many of them with their weapons (spears and some rifles). The weapons were laid in a row near the fire. 8. The four elders then took a mouthful of sorghum and sprayed it out over the weapons in a blessing gesture. The baboons here, let the spear eat them, let them go and eat stone
B'olley
Then all four people on the cowhide repeated:
Kutuka kus beto kuro, beto kus kabara mad'ak, ber-guo t w anaboy 38 Let them all eat stone in their mouth, let them eat stone and huit their eyes, let them be pierced by the fire-spear 26 
Mangàsha
Am wochkon bakaranui 39 I have no girl yet. Ga kumong* 40 Aren't you coming? Gaydutta zenasa woch kona kadagamagyen, amdak, amda èktabuyo 41 For this poor guy, call for him a girl to marry, if the crops ripen, let her go and work 9. At this point, the red earth was crushed with the black stone and then mixed with water and some ash of the baboon-grass. The four people on the cow-hide then proceeded to 'paint', with crossed arrm, each other's forehead, cheeks, ehest and arms with this mixture B'olley used the black river stone to apply it on the stomach of h is partners. They then said to each other: 10. Subsequently, the rest of the people came forward to be smeared with the water-clay mixture. In the meantime, women roasted the rest of the sorghum in the fire. B'olley poured out some of the coffee from the gourd on the ground, near the fire. He then smeared some of the sorghum ears with the clay mixture, and put them on the fire. 11 The rest of the sorghum was taken by the four elders and 'poured' into their hands by turn, whereby a Me'en-tAz'm man gave it to his kokó and then received it back. They threw some of it backwards over their shoulder, and some in front of them. Only then they could actually eat the sorghum, but again part of it was spat into the fire. When the rest of the participants came forward, they received roasted sorghum from the four elders, through B'olley, who gave it to his kokó (Mängäsha), who gave it to the people. 12. While all held the sorghum in their hands, the four elders went to sit in front of the fire in a row, B'olley in the front. Then the final words of the ceremony were said by him: 13. All people then ate the sorghum. The remaining coffee was drunk by the four elders and sprayed out over the weapons. With the last bit, B'olley poured out the final libation on the ground, presumably for the ancestors hè just mentioned (and by implication for those of the other three clan représentatives). 14. The owners of the weapons came forward to take them back and then ran out in all directions shouting 'Wu, wu, wu r ', symbolically chasing away all the pests and wild animais referred to in the previous text.
The final stage of the mósit was, as usual, the singing and dancing of seasonal songs called gulé, well into the night. This is not part of the ritual proper.
The ritual was described above in 51 lines of text accompanying 15 action séquences. These can be reduced to 5 action components (or 'action éléments' in Lawson & McCauley's terminology, 1990:87) , which express the organizing ideas of the ritual. They are the following: a. the création of fire (numbers l and 2) b. the cursing of potential erop destroyers (3) (4) c. the blessing for protection of the crops (5-8) d. the protection and strengthening of the people (9) (10) e. the appeal to the superhuman agents for confirmation of the preceding and giving évidence of being strengthened (By taking up the arms and lashing out at the competing animais) (11) (12) (13) (14) .
Within the constraints of the aims of these action components, the participants know what to do and what not: they follow the 'script' or recognizable pattern (Lawson & McCauley (1990:84f.) , one can translate the five points above into a formai description of the structure of action, or a cognitive représentation of the ritual which reflects, ultimately, the particular commitment of the religion's conceptual system. (ibid. : 87). Within the limited scope of this article, the accompanying 'tree structure' figuresanalogous to the structural trees of generative linguists; see Lawson & McCauley 1990 , Ch. 5-will not be given here. The important point is that the final action element (11) (12) (13) (14) présupposes the previous four ones and is, in terms of the ritual structure of the mósit as a whole, the culmination of it. A brief commentary on the acts of the ritual will illustrate this irreversible order. * For the ritual to have force, fire has to be created 'from nothing', as if it did not exist. It would, for instance, be completely beside the point to take it from the hearth of a nearby homestead. Fire was given by Tuma to humans. The smoke of the fire 'cleans' or 'protects' the crops on the fïelds. In the mósit, it also figures as préparation for the use of the ripe crops as food for thé four groups which hâve grown them. * The fire burning, and thé three ritual plants prepared, thé animal crop pests (in thé form of the worm) can be ritually attacked, 'sent back to the forest', or destroyed. * The ripe sorghum of this year's harvest cannot just be eaten as one likes: it must be blessed and dedicated to the power(s) which made it grow, in a genera! sense. Also the human effort needed for defending the crops (against the various animais) is to be acknowledged. This is done with the spray blessing (an obvious analogy with rain from Tuma) with the mixture of the chewed plant leaves and coffee (always used in a ritual context). * The next episode continues with the 'strengthening' of the participants (responsible for the past and coming year's actual work) with the mixture of water, ashes from the grass and the red soil. The round black basalt stone used for applying it comes from the Omo river, which the twelve original Me'en clans see as their place of origin. Note that this ritual strengthening of the people comes at the end of the growing season when stocks are low, bef ore they partake of the plentiful new harvest (and of the fresh sholu beer made from it) which will in f act give them new strength. * At this point, the new sorghum can be eaten by the four participants together, seated in the peculiar row, making the call to the ancestors. We see here that the final spray-blessing and libation of coffee and the words said here (lines 48-50) are the most important ones, containing the final call to superhuman agents to ally themselves with the living for protection and strength. (Shu 3 aya was a female in the patri-clan of B'olley, the main agent in the ritual). After the appeal to Tuma, the one to the k'alua, the spirit of the ancestors acldressed through Shu'âya, closes the ceremony, and underlines the commitment in this ritual to the agency of these few superhuman agents, within the religieus conceptual system of the Me'en. This final 'statement' in the ritual makes use of all the preceding embedded ritual actions (making the fire, cleaning the crops, protectively 'painting' the people, 'sending off' animal competitors into the forest, roasting the new sorghum, beckoning Tuma and the ancestors) for the concluding commensal act of the four clan représentatives and the confirming of their continued coopération.
In the ritual we see that the rôle of two principles held to be universal in religieus ritual Systems: the principle of superhuman agency (Lawson & McCauley 1990; 124) and the principle of superhuman immediacy (ibid.: 125). They state, respectively, that postulated superhuman agencies are in some way held to be acting in the context of the ritual, and that they are seen as immediately involved in the ritual. Both principles are at work in the mósit (see again, lines 36, 48 and 50). Here, Tuma and the ancestors are asked to listen to (and grant the people) what they plead and hope for, and in the second instance an ancestor (Shu'âya) is seen as 'coming near'. The imphed rôle of the superhuman agents in the mósit is, however, limited The ritual demands as much the active participation of humans themselves and their engagement with their environment The understanding or the 'contract' with nature, and also with the 'social partners', représentatives of which were seated on the cattle-hide with B'olley, has to be renewed According to the prédiction of Lawson & McCauley (1990: 134-135 ), the mósit is by nature an annual ritual with limited effects, which must be repeated.
Interpretation
We have seen that for an explanation of the mósit cultural information on such things as the composition of the four officiating people, the purposely difficult way of making fire, the particular plants used, the protective substance smeared on people, etc are all interwoven in a complex but structured pattern with which the participants are familiär, i e , on which they have compétence In this section, further interpretive notes on the background and setting of the ritual m Me'en culture are given, m order to complete the genera! account of the previous section As Lawson & McCauley repeatedly stated, in addition to the description of the action structure of the ritual, the interpretive context has to be clarified to provide a fuller understanding of its semantics l Environment
As may be apparent, there are very direct environmental or ecological référants in the text The words reflect the central concerns of the people involved growth and abundance of staple crops, protection against disease and pests, enhancmg the reproductive capac ity of domestic animais and people (as evident from the frequent références to women and marrying) It appeals to an idea of coopération or symbiosis of man and nature in général. Each is urged to stay in lts proper place: wild animais, worms, birds, etc., shouJd stay m their domain-the forest-and humans and domestic animais should receive their share of produce according to what they have 'invested' A direct référence to rainfall, the central prerequisite for good crop yields, is absent (thé one référence to Tuma-the word meaning 'God' as well as 'rain' and 'sky'-clearly is to God). The mésit seems to deal almost exclusively with animate beings which can threaten thé crops when they are near harvesting. There are a few crucial références to thé superhuman beings or agents, but otherwise thé supernatural aspect does not dominate. The natural world, thé world of thé ancestors and thé world of the living are seen as part of one whole. This ritual is both an explicit, protective performance aimed at competitors of thé human population, as well as a général appeal or prayer to a transcendent or superhuman power which controls thé more basic conditions of growing power, température and rainfall (Tuma), and fertility of thé so il of the forefathers and -mothers and of the descendants (ancestors). The ritual contains an appeal and a threat (by means of the expressed intention to use thé spears) and thus 'communicates', to thé natural competitors to remain in their own domain, away from humans. The various plants used in thé ritual (apart from the tulmit) are strong lowlarid plants, relatively pest-résistant. They are traditionally seen as 'hot', powerful plants, and thus perhaps provide either a kind of 'model' for thé ripening crops, or an alternative wild food source which thé forest animais should eat instead of the planted crops. Nevertheless, thé précise reason for thèse plants (see above, The Setting) having been selected can perhaps never be revealed.
Social Structure
As we saw, the mósit carries an element of 'auto-communication' : from the setting and thé composition of thé group of 'actors' it is clear that a 'message' is expressed by, as well as sent to, thé participants, and it is hère that an additional aspect of morality is constituted. The ritual appears to express a careful balance between représentatives of specified local groups which are basically 'equal' in status terms of resource use, labour effort and domestic organisation and are partly dépendent on each other as well. There is also a playful référence to thé possible affinai bonds between thé groups (Unes 39-41). Apart from the mósit, this idea of balance is also expressed in thé Me'en rituals of marriage, burial and disease control. Although in the mósit performance, a member from a Me'enchim clan is the most important officiating person (by virtue of his inherited membership of a 'founder clan'), the others are not really lower in status: there is only a 'division of labour' in the ritual performance. For all practical purposes, the (rnembers of the) groups are equal: différences in power and social distance are not relevant in the ritual. They are neither pervasive in real life.
It is an old question of why people engage in ritual, and of what the status is of the kind of 'instrumental connection' they see between what they are doing and the 'effects' they may hope it will produce. While great care was taken to carry out the correct order and manner of the ritual actions, the measure of playfulness and joking which was observed during this mósit was notable: a sensé of humour is not forbidden. This and the genera! subjunctive style of much of the text itself suggests that any simple causal connection is not asserted by the Me'en participants. They know that ultimate determining factors are things like sufficient rainfall, sélection and care for crops, their own hard work in the fïelds, and their being alert to animal pests throughout the growing period (e.g., by guarding and armed repulsion of pigs, buffaloes, and baboons). But the rituad as an activity indeed brings together people to produce a 'model', or to uphold and assert a norm of group coopération and of harmony of humans and the wider environment. Granted the général but remote assumptions of their religious world-view, it may not be more than that: basically the expression, along analogical lines of thought, of an ideal, the realization of which is always precarious. The ritual activity also canalizes the feit need for coopérative group-labour in an indirect way, thus-as politeness théories of social life have it (cf. Strecker 1988: 204)-reducing the recourse to major 'face-threatening acts' between individuals and groups living on terms of relative equality, placed in a shared, jointly apprehended and appropriated environment.
One might say that the ritual model as such 'works' in Me'en culture. The fact that, in the common view of scientifically-minded and other outsiders, most of the postulated connections may be wishful thinking or just wrong is irrelevant. This is a neointellectualist interprétation which does not exhaust the range of meaning of ritual (which, as we saw above, does not by définition have a referential dimension). Newton's physics was also proved 'wrong' by subséquent théories like relativity theory and quantum physics, but this did not prevent it from working for a long time and giving rise to numerous research questions, inventions and applica-tions (Cf. thé points made earlier about the theory of 'affordances' of the environment, to which humans directly and pragmatically respond).
Cognition and Control-The mósit as 'Religion'
The Me'en obviously do not adhère to Christianity or Islam, and indeed have no interest in these faiths. Looking at this central ritual, the mósit, it cannot be said that they 'have no religion' (A statement one often fïnds in reports which used to be made by the southwestern district administrators gathering basic ethnographie information on the ethno-cultural groups under their control). If 'religion' is meant to refer not only to the 'high' or 'revealed' religions but to all Systems of belief in cosmological connections between humans and nature and to moral rules following from them, then a ritual like the mósit has a clear religions dimension. In the section on Delineating ritual above, we mentioned Rappaport's view on ritual as having a dimension of morality. This we recognized on several levels: 1. the belief in the mutual influencing of humans and nature, as directly evident from the text, 2. the connection with the superhuman agents important in the Me'en worldview, and 3. the social setting of the ritual's performance. First, in the text itself, we saw that an attempt is made by the concerned people to 'appeal' to Tuma (God), albeit only once, to the ancestors of their clan-or family-groups, and to nature to let their means of livelihood grow undisturbed. It is thus an effort to establish a moral understanding with the natura! forces which partly threaten them, as well as with the supporting force of the superhuman agents. Secondly, a look at the setting of the mósit showed that the idea of coopération or of 'contract' between human groups of diverse origin is present: as we saw, it is always performed by members of local groups who are dependent upon each other in a real sensé. Also, if the crops in one year fail, the next year's mósit is performed by a différent combination of people, from différent clan-groups.
Via Lawson & McCauley's theory we saw that there is a clear connection of the ritual with the wider religieus conceptual System of thé Me'en as a whole. Without referring to this connection, thé ritual could not really be explained. The mósit thus seems to be covered by thé description of ritual given above in terms of cognition. First of all, the body of ritual actions is traceable and explainable in terms of général psychological mechanisms and reveals generative patterns. Secondly and connected with this, there is the underlying concern, seen in much of the text, with a désire for control, for making non-human forces manageable. The ritual is an enacted drama drawing near the natural and the human for the purpose of establishing an order or a contract between human activity and nature's activity which may be in compétition with each other. This is also suggested by the subjunctive style of the text throughout: to whom are those invocations (in the basic schema of 'Let the good come to us and let the bad stay away or be chased away and killed') addressed? The answer came towards the end of the text: not only to Tuma, but especially to their ancestors (especially Shu'âya), who have inhabited the land before thern and may still influence the lot of their descendants. In other mósü texts which I heard, références to local spirits (k'olle) were also made. These various concepts are ideational représentations, which have a partly explanatory and partly self-referential function in the workl-view of the Me'en, allow them-in the ritual with its formal séquence of acts and stages-to construct meaning via social drama. The représentations form the religieus conceptual system within which the ritual acts move to establish meaning and order in the relations of the Me'en with their environment, which they know intimately but which always remains insecure.
Conclusion
The above analysis and explanation of the mósü ritual of the Me'en has not been limited to a thick description but has purposely been placed within a wider theoretical frame inspired by a cognitive approach. No large claims have been made here toward any ultirnate explanation of the mósü ritual or the larger religious conceptual system of the Me'en, but its basic action structure and organisation have been explicated, and its meaning in the wider religious conceptual system and way of life of the Me'en has been clarified. Besides the more religious rituals, the Me'en know also 'secular' rituals (where the rôle of superhuman agents is not referred to), like the purification ceremonies after homicide or adultery. A weak point in Lawson & McCauley's cognitive theory may be that it does not address such rituals. Here Rappaport's view on ritual as an organized human effort to establish a 'morality', a social contract, mây be fruitful, because it may^allbw us to loqate the cognitive endeavour of humans in their very socwlity.
The móstt ritual discusseé here is of course not unique in its kind. The many commonalities in annual or seasonal rituals as § they are known from thé ethnographie record, cross-culturally and over large time-spans, do lend themselves for systematic comparison. Ultimately, the inner logic which religieus ritual obeys is, plausibly, a reflection of the organisational constraints of the cognitive huhian mechanism on cultural material. In this light, the theory offered by Lawson and McCauley, by starting to look at the action structure of ritual, can be productively used as a springboard for comparative explanations of religious ritual Systems.
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Breaking and Making the State: The Dynamics of Ethnie Democracy in Ethiopia
In the past four yeairs, Ethiopia, as a state and as an idea, seems to have gone through a process of 'deconstruction'. In a political sense, the entity called 'Ethiopia' is under sévère strain, and in an ideological sense, the idea of cohésion or unity of this old African state is more contested than ever. It is clear to see that traditional structures are being rethought and recast during the years of political expérimentation and restructuring under the new transitional government since May 1991. In this process, the 'imagination' of Ethiopia becomes more and more difficult as well. This appears to be a deliberate effect of the new policy promoted by the present rulers. The background of this development is well known: the implosion of the communist-oriented regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, which could not hold together in the face of the combined impact of years of mismanagement and interna! decay and the cutting of its ideological and material support lines to the Soviet Union and other communist-bloc countries from late 1989. On 28 May 1991, the old government of the former Workers' Party of Ethiopia 1 ignominously crumbled, a week after the flight of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Zimbabwe, to be replaced by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratie Front (EPRDF), with at its core the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), originating from the northern highland région of Tigray. At the same moment, Eritrea, until then the most northern administrative région of Ethiopia, was taken over by the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front with the capture of Asmara, after a nearly 30-year-old civil war. (It has declared itself independent, after a referendum, on 25 May 1993).
Immediately after the capture of Addis Ababa by the EPRDF, carried out with American approval and encouragement on 28 May 1994, a 'National Conference of Peace and Reconciliation' was called in the capital. Many ethno-political libération movements who had been active against the previous regime were invited (among them the Oromo Liberation Front, the Afar Liberation Front and the remnant of the Western Somali Liberation Front), and also several other very hastily set-up 'organisations'. 2 But not all anti-Mengistu groups were welcome. Excluded, for instance, was the still existing Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a formerly populär leftist political and guérilla movement which had fought a tough battle with Mengistu's regime in the late 1970s, but which was also an old rival of the TPLF. The conference led to the adoption of a national 'Charter for the Transitional Period', to the installation of a transitional government, and of a non-elected 87-member Council of Représentatives (COR). The Charter document 3 was to be the suprême law of the country until a new constitution could be promulgated. It described the provisional new democratie order, including the prospect for élections, préparation of the constitution, press f reedom, and freedom of movement and association. So far, we may see some parallel with démocratisation movements in other African countries, such as Benin, Togo, or Malawi -although in Ethiopia, the discontinuity with the previous regime (the Der gué) is much more radical: the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) has dismanüed not only the unity party and the government of Mengistu, but also replaced virtually all senior government personnel and reformed all state agencies and institutional structures. The former regime's military forces, close to half a million strong, were disbanded. There was ne ver any doubt as to what group would dominate the TGE and the COR in the subséquent period and beyond: the military victors are the EPRDF, more particularly the TPLF. They had, while still fighting, already prepared their policy blueprints for Ethiopia after the take-over, and have been generally faithful to them ever since.
This article aims to give a dispassionate survey of the developments in Ethiopia since 1991, in order to assess some prospects of the expérimental policy course followed by the new government.
The Ethiopian Experiment and the Debate about Démocrati-sation in Africa
In the current debates on démocratisation movements and the so-called era of 'mass-participation' in African politics, Ethiopia does not figure prominently. Nevertheless, the changes occurring there are of fundamental importance not only in the context of the country itself, but also in that of the larger région of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia may indeed be, as its public image still suggests, 'different' frorn other African states (apart from Eritrea, it was never colonised, it has an approximately 2000 year-old state tradition in the highland area, as well as ancient literató traditions and indigenous forais of Christianity and Islam). But in many respects it is also a 'typical African society' : with a héritage of underdevelopment and poverty, ecological and démographie problems, internai divisions, ethnie diversity, and a state marred by financial problems and corruption. 4 Relatively little attention is paid by the Western media to developments in Ethiopia -for rio direct Western interests are at stake -and there is minimal attempt to understand political and social developments from a more local perspective, or from a socto-cultural perspective. The consequent ignorance of most Westerners is compounded by the country's bewildering variety of political and/or libération movements, and the confusing number of news magazines which, because written in Amharic, are relatively inaccessible to most foreigners. In addition, the government always has a public story or version of events which is specially tailored for Western (färänji) observers, and which may be quite different from versions known to the natives. Neither do Westerners attach any real urgency to the situation in Ethiopia, presumably because the communist regime has gone, the civil war has ended, the problem of Eritrea has been solved, and the proclamations and policies of the present TGE superficially indicate a steady course toward a democratie form of governance. Compared to the former government of Mengistu, much indeed has changed. However, the foundation of new power structures and of what is defined as democracy and accountability presently being prepared by the TGE deserves close scrutinity, with a long-term perspective, and with more attention to local constitutions of identity and nationhood in a historical and cultural sense. This paper will not address the latter thème in detail, but limit itself to a largely factual survey of recent trends.
Assumptïons and Outlinès of the New Polîcy y
In recent years, the TGE has carried out a rhetorically and strategically very ;'xintelligent policy of restructuring the Ethiopian state and of delegitimising old -l eadership elites, mostly in ethnie terms. The policy measures have been graduai V| V J* but décisive, and have led to far-reaching changes, intended to modify traditional ƒ/>. frameworks of régional and 'ethnie' identity, and to replace old power holders, 'fy including experiericed professionals and experts, from important positions all Vv across the country, and to a politicisation of 'ethnie' différence even in remote rij: corners of the countryside.
'J? # Notwithstanding the criticism generaled mainly from within the country and from f '$ Ethiopian commurdties abroad, one has to acknowledge that the Ethiopian experi-"ffl ment in dévolution of central state power to régions and of 'ethnicisation' of '-£1 national politics can be characterised as unique in Africa, and that it has its <C negative as well as its positive points. 5 The new authorities like to see it as an -? |, effort at internai 'de-colonisation', doing away with inequality and national op--jf pression. The official programme is democratie restructuring of the country, St enhancing 'real political participation of the masses' (especially the rural popuia-4 tion), and ethno-regional rights for previously oppressed peoples or nationalities.
,,* ( Time and again, these éléments are repeated in official discourse. The implication f is that the idea of national unity or identity of Ethiopia, raised on a partly accident al amalgam of dozens of ethnie groups, should be rethought -not only politi-/, ; ' cally but also ideologically. In this context, the EPRDF has not only devalued the y j Marxist narrative of national unity and development prevalent under the previous J r egime, but also continues to prevent any return to the idea of an integrating rôle for Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (about 55 per cent of the population), as was "'?' claimed under Hai Ie Selassie. There is now a policy of balancing it with Islam, so ",,}, that neither can put its stamp on Ethiopian 'national identity'.
( t "
' "/?
The underlying motive -and the rationale for the EPRDF/TPLF armed struggle î n the past 20 years -was that of breaking the old socio-political order and the 'V:
hegemony of what they saw as thé 'Amhara' people (in particular, thé Amhara from Shoa, thé région around Addis Ababa), identified with thé leading stratum under the previous two regimes, and over-represented in state administration, leadership positions, thé professions, etc. In the background, the old historical rivalry between thé Tigray and thé Amhara (who are, however, strictly speaking neither a 'nationality' nor an 'ethnie group'; cf. Heran 1994; Takkele 1994, and the conflict was played out mainly on thé le vel of their political élites: nobles and war-lords) plays a rôle, fed by a populist interprétation of certain historical events, like thé crushing of thé Weyyane rébellion in 1943 in Tigray and of the décades-long neglect, e.g., in times of famine, of thé Tigray région by thé central government. 6 The core ideological assumption of the EPRDF and thus of the TGE policy, has been that democracy can only be established through ethnicity, through regionally-defined ethnie rights. People are first and foremost members of a community: only as such can they realise their rights. The individualist model of repré-sentative aggregate democracy is abandoned in favour of a cantonised form. This idea is of course a logical resuit of thé concept of 'national libération' used by thé TPLF and orner ethnie organisations, which all emerged after the violent suppression of nation-wide, non-ethnie leftist revolutionary groups like EPLF and MEISON (thé All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement). When thèse were crushed by thé Mengistu government in thé 'Red Terror' period , many members of thé defeated groups took thé 'ethnie option', by returning to their home régions and starting again there to mobilise support. The ethno-regional factor was rhetorically and practically helpful in this mobilisation effort. The ethnie groups were ail declared as having been 'oppressed' by thé previous régimes and as deserving their rights (use of their own language, their own resources, more régional power, no more cultural hegemonism, etc.). The TPLF now submits that no country can be held together by force, but only by thé free and voluntary choice of its peoples to stay together (thé assumptions being that people primarily define themselves on the basis of 'ethnicity', that groups have well-defined borders, feel oppressed as a group and are or should be located in one région only).
While good as a battle cry, thèse principles hâve their own problems on thé level of national state policy. It is one thing to déclare thé rights of ethnie communities, invariably called 'nationalities' in state discourse, but another to make them thé units for a workable state policy. The predictable criticism of a large part of the Ethiopian public was: what about thé mixture of groups, in régional distribution, in économie life, in marriage and descent, in preferred 'ethnie' identification? There may be no real solution for this except that of force.
The record of thé TGE so far has shown a consistent élaboration of 'ethnie policy'. It has its own problems and promises. 7 The former Marxist ideology which thé TPLF cherished up to six months bef ore their take-over in May 1991 has been abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic outlook, especially in thé économie sphère. In thé political sphère, however, organisational principles de-rived from Leninism ('dual structures' of government and administration, democratie centralism, controlled media, a strong army for law-and-order purposes and <f as a pillar for the power structure) are seemingly still maintained, and the national policy of the EPRDF and TGE so far shows a remarkable continuity with the ideology and plans which the TPLF had when still fighting in the bush (cf. Markakis 1987:253-55) .
Results and Problems of the Ethiopian Experiment
Some key issues to consider are the following:
« As the EPRDF model for the Ethiopian state is no longer of a unitary state, but of a loose fédération of (ethno-)regions, one of the first things done by the TGE, and duly approved by the COR (in 1991), was to introducé a new regional map of Ethiopia, based on ethno-regions in each of which one ethnie group would have a clear (ideally an overwhelming) majority. There were 14 régions (called killit), among them Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Beni Shangul, Tigray, Somali, Sidama, and Kafa: all ethnie names. Preferably, people of 'foreign, non-indigenous' origins -especially of course the 'Amhara' immigrants or their descendants, pejoratively called neft'ennyas ('armed settlers') -should not be there. Also all skilied and teaching jobs should be filled by locals, and not by 'immigrants'.
• Especially in the early years (1991-93), the politics of encouragement of ethnie rights and autonomy in the countryside led to a chaotic period of violent rivalry and power-struggle on the local level. In some areas, e.g., in Arussi, Harar, and Balé, it sometimes amounted to a campaign of 'ethnie cleansing', whereby 'non-natives' or 'neft'ennyas' were harrassed and their houses burnt down. Dozens of people were also chased away or killed. These actions were perhaps also thought of historically as a revenge of groups conquered in the time of Emperor Minilik II around the turn of the Century, on the descendants of their conquerors. The rôle of EPRDF troops, supposed to keep law and order, was often not clear -they did not always prevent such massacres, but let the 'spontaneous process of conflict' run its course. The tactics of today have become less violent, but serve the same purpose. There are charges of intimidation and economie boycotting which have the same long-term effect of chasing people out of the régions where they were born and had jobs. In addition, there are still border conflicts between adjoining régions. For instance, people from Wälqait, an area in thé former province of Gondar where Tigrinya is also spoken, objected to being included in the new expanded Tigray région. Several months ago they sent a délégation of elders to Addis Ababa to protest, but these were not heard but arrested. There are also cases of people who were assigned to one région, and who lost some of their land, who are now located in another région.
The politics of 'démocratisation' are being tightly controlled by the EPRDF. They make thé policy, get their proposais through thé COR -which was not elected -and avoid substantial debate with minority groups in thé COR or in thé opposition. The COR is, generally speaking, not an autonomous law-making body (which it indeed by law cannot be). The minority parties, let alone the opposition, hâve no political leverage. For instance, thé Oromo Liberation Front, in opting out of the TGE and the COR in July 1992 because of serions disagreements with the TPLF, has been neither prudent nor wise. 9 It had 17 seats in thé COR and some members in thé Cabinet. In late 1994 there was talk of them returning and retaking their seats, but thé reaction of the EPRDF was evasive. Hence whereas critics argue that the TGE as a transitional body should be attempting to implement a broad-based policy, especially when it envisages long-term policies and laws reshaping the face of the country, by either barring relevant opposition groups from the COR or the TGE, or by purposely marginalising them, or as a result of self-inflicted exclusion (OLF), the EPRDF reigns suprême and, according to several observers, increasingly autocratically (cf. Makau wa Mutua 1993b; 1994). As long as the EPRDF has the leading positions m the TGE, its political agenda will not be fundamentally influenced by other parties or social groups. This may, indeed, reflect its political weight, yet it is scarcely conducive to the democratie atmosphère which they claim to be creating in the country.
While the TGE and EPRDF allowed the formation of political opposition parties under certain conditions, they have not been content to allow them to operate freely. Although these parties cannot be prevented or be legally disbanded if they have adopted the Charter and do not openly plead for violence, the TGE/EPRDF succeeds in harrassing them by means of intimidation by soldiers, by searching and vandalising their party premises and the homes of their adhérents, or by arresting or kidnapping activists and leaders, or by taking them to court on dubious évidence. 10 Not only AAPO (All-Amhara Peoples' Organization) and CAFPDE (Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy), but also OLF, EPRP and ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) have been declared outcasts, and several members of these groups have been harrassed and detained without cogent charges.
In addition to this, the EPRDF has, since 1990, set up proxy parties directed at the varions ethnie constituencies to compete with the above-mentioned, more rooted parties. These alternative parties, instigated by and allied to the EPRDF, are often recognisable by their name, ending in "Peoples' Democratie Organisation" (the so-caUed PDOs), e.g. WPDO (Wolayta), the HPDO (Hadiyya), and OPDO (Oromo Peoples' Democratie Organisation). It is said that the leadership of these PDOs is often made up of relatively unknown 'grassroots people' from the ethnie group in question, who have everything to gain from accepting a post under the EPRDF.
11 The OPDO is of course meant to lure the Oromo away from the OLF, IFLO and other Oromo groups. The OPDO also fonctions as the party which produces cadres and administrators for the Oromia Region. Another good example is the ANDM (Amhara People' s Democratie Movement, formerly EPDM) of the present Prime Minister Tamrat Layne and part of the EPRDF. It emerged from the EPRP in the late 1970s. It is now functioning as an alternative to the AAPO or for some constituent parties of the CAFPDE. Ethiopian and foreign observers seeing all this are not convinced that there is free compétition of political groups in the country.
The drafting of a new constitution, although announced as a democratie process whereby all the civilians would have a significant say, was dominated by the TGE and the commission it had appointed. Open discussions in the k 'ebeles (the urban dwellers' associations and the peasants' associations) did not yield substantial changes, nor were they meant to. The meetings themselves were only visited by ari estimated five per cent of the total population. Even so, they allowed for the voicing of serious criticism of the draft constitution, yet they made no significant impact upon the final text. Since the discussions started in the media and in the Constituent Assembly, the clauses on the land-lease law, on the 'right to sécession' of disaffected ethno-regions and on some religious rights for Christians, proved controversial. But they were not rescinded or reformulated in the final version, approved in December 1994.
There is a fear, in business classes and among the peasantry in many régions, that too much power for the various régions (differing substantially in population, resources, and wealth) will lead to internai conflicts, structural inequalities, and impediments for natural economie exchange, trade or employment opportunities. On the last point, for example, superfluous experts in one région will be seriously discouraged from working and living in another région where they do not 'ethnically belong'. The régions have to train their own manpower. This is already happening. The extra costs and the productive years lost with this policy need not be emphasised.
In connection with the foregoing, there is deep scepticism about the new educational policies of the TGE. In many rural areas, even in Oromo country, peasants are worried about the policy of teaching school children in the local language (many dozens in the various régions) instead of in Amharic, which is still the lingua franca. They may agrée with the use of their language for literacy -which goes faster in the local language -but not for administrative purposes, 'cutting off their région from thé wider whole. Their argument is interesting: they say, against thé self-appointed ethnie leaders of the PDOs and other 'libération groups', that it is of little use to learn thé language they already know at home also in the schools: the challenge is to learn another language, one used nationwide, and on that account more important, in order to enable their children to advance and perhaps escape the poor lives they live in their own région. Amharic is still one vehicle for this and is still the most widespread language in the country. The language policy (not mentioning thé substantial practical problems and thé costs of translating and/or preparing teaching materials in ail thé languages) has also led to local rivalries between y/ W J* f' certain 'language groups' if the 'dialect' of one language within a related group (e.g. Omotic) is taken as thé standard for minority groups. Education will also politicise ethno-regional identity and de-emphasise an idea of national identity -which may be one of the underlying purposes of the policy in thé first place.
• An important but less tangible change occurring in Ethiopian society today is the elbowing out of the old educated strata and, what some observers call, thé 'Tigrayardsation' of the power structure. Irrespective of âge, expérience or job qualifications, many leading positions in the state machinery, the public services, thé economy, thé decision-making centres from thé national to thé local level, are given to people of Tigray background. This seems to be a fairly consistent trend, meant to install a new and young génération of loyal people who owe their promotion and jobs to me EPRDF. Such favouritism has been commented upon as a typical trait of African politics in général (cf. Bayait 1993, especially chapter nine).
• Another notable fact is that EPRDF-cadres and army units in most of the country form a kind of dual administration. Acting behind thé 'democratically chosen' local administrators, they are suspect for many local résidents. Similarly, thé police force is being instructed by these units behind thé scènes, and cannot act independently in maintaining thé law. Thèse local officiais ultimately are accountable to and dépendent (for their jobs) on thé EPRDF repré-sentatives.
As a resuit of nearly four years of transitional policy, thé face of Ethiopia and of its society has already changed substantially. Economically, there is a more open market-oriented economy, which has eased conditions for économie activity but
has not yet led to an upsurge of significant, durable économie growth or an increase in living standards. Ethiopia has been led to adopt a Structural Adjustment Programme, with predictable social problems emerging. 12 There are many people being dismissed from government service, and thé growing number of beggars in thé capital is one indication of thé continuing général misery. In thé rural areas, there is land scarcity due to returning ex-soldiers, excessive population growth and continuing degeneration of the land, to which thé government's answers are slow in coming and diffïcult to implement. Several highly important nation-wide économie schemes are faltering. 13 The middle classes (businessmen, professionals, teachers, or traders, forming a stratum of diffuse ethnie origins) are not overly happy with thé ethnie policies which they fear may artificially increase group boundaries and régional and 'ethnie identities': in thèse circles, which never thought in strict terms of ethnicity, it is said that for business, social mobility and development it would be better for Ethiopia to hâve a unitary structure instead of a fédération of autonomous ethno-regions with their own économie, licensing and tax régimes.
In terms of ethnie self-identification, thé TGE/EPRDF has succeeded in making ethnicity or 'nationality' an ever-present, and often highly emotional, issue in the minds of Ethiopians. The formerly mainly culturally expressed sense of ethnicity, and enacted in religion, life-cycle rituals, festivals, second language use, etc., has now been politicised to such a degree that it has become an ideology of opposition and exclusion. Obviously not all groups regret this: the OLF and the ONLF and the new intellectual cadre of minority ethnie groups, for instance, encourage ethnie consciousness in ail respects, not objecting to thé essentially divisive fonction of this ideology. They say that a new 'Habesha hegemonism' in Ethiopia, this time not of Amhara but of Tigray, should be avoided. Other groups like the Gurage, Wolayta or Dorze (with many members dispersed all over the country) do not see the big advantages of ethnie autonomism. All agrée, however, that national policy so far has been too much of a one-group affair, and that the basis for political decision-making in this transitional period should be broadened. But opposition appeals to this effect have always been neglected or rejected by the president and the government. 14 Politically speaking, décentralisation and ethnicisation of the régions is well under way. The core of regional (killil) governments has been established. In élections, the new policy would also mean that no group can get a majority beyond its own région, due to the system of region-level élections at one remove. Even in ideal procédural circumstances, non-ethnie parties would not be allowed or would stand no chance of winning such élections.
Elections
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On 5 June 1994, élections for a 'Constituent Assembly' were held. They formed a ĉ onspicuous index to gauge thé process of top-down 'démocratisation' in thé < country. The élection process illustrated the measure of power monopoly and skillful manoeuveiing of thé présent government. The occasion of thé élections V did not solve thé dilemmas of 'ethnie' politics, but confirmed ail thé core traits of , * thé new political thinking and the new democratie centralist structure of 'powerdistribution' in the country via thé new régions. The élections were very well prepared. In thé 14 régions, candidates for thé 548-seat Constituent Assembly i' were to be elected, under thé auspices of thé National Electoral Board of Ethiopia -,' (set up in 1993 and accountable to thé COR and thé TGE.) The job of the Constituent Assembly was to discuss, amend and approve thé draft constitution ( prepared in the first half of 1994 by a spécial commission appointed by thé TGE and led by thé law expert Kifle Wodajo. 15 The legitimacy of the draft was | contested by ail parties not represented in thé Council of Représentatives, as well ; as by large sections of the Ethiopian people.
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The Constituent Assembly élections were thé second round of nation-wide elec--l ions organised by thé TGE. In June 1992, local élections (for zones and districts) ĥ ad been held, already based on the new regional map of the country. 16 The j purpose then had been to elect local administrators (often through new local
• ' ethnie parties) and to legitimise the Transitional Government, in which the , "' EPRDF were thé main power. The 1992 élections were strongly dominated by thé EPRDF, and thé organisation was such that in virtually ail places thé EPRDFsponsored candidates were elected, some critics saying that thé présence of the EPRDF army (thé former guérilla army which after thé 1991 victory functioned as a temporary national army), was in itself a factor conducive to this. In some districts, there were no party candidates at all, so that EPRDF candidates were elected by default. According to thé largely négative reports of international observers (cf. National Démocratie Institute -African-American Institute 1992), the failure of this event was due to several factors: a lack of material facilities and préparation, a voter-public not educated in élection procedures, the impossibility of many voters knowing what candidates were standing and for what, and in many places, a campaign of open or covert intimidation and violence, often by (pro-) EPRDF groups. Subséquent eye-witness reports from the countryside have confirmed this négative image. Due to pre-election pressure and alleged 'undemocratic' rnanoeuvering of thé TGE, some groups, like thé OLP, boycotted thé élections, after already having left thé TGE and thé Council shortly before that.
The Constituent Assembly élections of June 1994 were much improved in technical planning and exécution, but again the dominance of the EPRDF behind thé scènes was notable. Again, thé main opposition groups (OLF, AAPO, CAFPDE, and a southern peoples coalition) were absent because of their own boycott. Their line was (and is) that a policy of consensus, announced in 1991 for the transitional period, had been circumvented by the power-monopolising strategy of the EPRDF, which refused to broaden the base of the TGE and the decision-making structures. Also there were charges of intimidation by government troops and activists, and of biased screening of candidates (registered through the government-controlled local k'ebeles or local authorities). There were candidates from several remaining officially-allowed parties and organisations as well as 'independent' candidates (many connected to a party, and to the EPRDF).
Voters had to register before the élections. The percentage of people who did so, varied from région to région: from 44 per cent (in Harar) to 96.5 per cent (in Tigray). In Addis Ababa (Region 14), 53 per cent of the eligible voters registered.
The results of the low-key but largely peaceful élection did not corne as a surprise: in thé overwhelming majority of the électoral constituencies EPRDF candidates, or candidates supported by this coalition (TPLF-ANDM-OPDO), won. Turn-out was reasonably good, although in many areas people were pressured to vote through their k'ebeles in order not to lose some rights to buying cheap products like sugar and cooking ou. In thé countryside thé psychological dominance of pro-EPRDF candidates (often already holding officiai posts) as well as thé pressure to 'vote correctiy' was again such that one could perhaps not really speak of fully free and fair élections. A général problem was the lack of suitable candidates, partly because of the boycott by many opposition parties.
One interesting aspect of this 1994 round of élections was that ethnie groups with a membership of below 100 000 (the size of a constituency) automatically received a seat in the Constituent Assembly, because they might otherwise have been outvoted by the majority in their région. In this way, 22 groups each got a free seat, especially from the south and west of the country (including some groups which have riever seen Addis Ababa or never really dealt with the central government). Ipso facto, their représentatives can probably largely be seen as EPRDF-supporters.
A second interesting aspect was that a number of independent and oppositional candidates were nevertheless elected, despite their programmes not always being clear, and their links with existing parties being obscure. The eventual outcome was that EPRDF won 484 of the 548 seats (excluding the assigned ones). Curiously enough, virtually all the seats in the Oromia and the Amhara régions (most opposed to government policies) were also won by the EPRDF: 289 of the total of 294 were taken by ANDM and OPDO. In Addis Ababa, where more than half of the eligible voters did not vote, 13 of the 23 seats were won by the EPRDF, and eight by independent candidates. This was the lowest score for the EPRDF.
Before the élections, the organised opposition had manoeuvred itself into a Catch-22 situation: to participate would have meant to recognise the legitimacy of the EPRDF governmenl and the électoral process; to opt out meant marginalisation and losing any chance of national leverage or power-sharing. The EPRDF had counted on this, and -in view of the predictable reactions of Western observers and donors to non-participation of the opposition -took the credit.
In the sessions of the Constituent Assembly -which did not replace the Council of Représentatives -as well as in the regional governments, the TGE could thus count on loyal support for the constitutional draft, and for ils effort to federalise the country. The Constituent Assembly was active for about three or four months, and duly approved the constitution on December 8, 1994 . The Council of Repré-sentatives and the TGE then confirmed it. The next stage of the 'transition process' is that of national parliamentary élections, scheduled for May 1995, which are being prepared by the National Electoral Board. The 'transitional period' will be extended again to allow the TGE and the EPRDF to lead the process 'in the right direction'. If, as is to be expected, the political parties for these next élec-tions are required to have an 'ethnie identity' basis, and are denied the right to campaign nation-wide (i.e. are not permitted to register in other than their 'home régions'), then the outcome will again be a foregone conclusion.
Negotiations in Washington DC in early 1995 between members of the TGE and the main opposition groups such as AAPO, CAFPDE and OLP on a proposed rapprochement and on participation of these groups in the May élections have not led to clear results.
Prospects of the 'Ethnie State'
The 'revolutionary-democratic' reform policy of the TGE/EPRDF in the past four years has been directed at the consolidation of power and at strict implementation of its own agenda of 'démocratisation' along ethnie Unes. The process is controlled from above, keeping thé political process, party formation, opposition activities and the independent press under tight surveillance. The old programme of ethnie 'fédéralisation' of the country continues, employing thé law-making process in thé COR, and using educational policy and économie dévolution and restructuring. Thus a political structure of counter-balancing régions, with none strong enough to dominate the country, is being aimed at, ideologically buttressed by supposée! ly self-évident collective 'ethnie identities'. The long-term rôle of the centre, the Ethiopian state, is still in doubt, but political and économie conditions and considérations make it clear that it cannot simply 'wither away' (Eshetu 1994:25) .
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It can be concluded that populär expectations among thé Ethiopian public in May 1991 about thé prospects for démocratisation, political freedom and quick éco-nomie upsurge were too extravagant. Perhaps it was chimerical to think that thé TGE would create a viable and broadly accepted political order on thé smoking scrap-heaps of Mengistu's Ethiopia. The chaos and thé héritage of 17 years of mismanagernent and destruction were too much to correct in so short a period. But whatever the reasons, the feelings of disappointment in the country are widespread. The paradoxical policy of ethnicisation and EPRDF-hegemonism, thé lack of visible économie progress, thé manipulations of the democratie order, and thé widespread security problems, create an atmosphère of irritation and fear for thé future.
It is also possible that within thé EPRDF, there is no ultimate clarity about thé question of ethnicity and national cohésion. The EPRDF itself has problems with thé notion of complète sécession of disaffected groups from the country, judging, for example, from its reactions to thé course of thé OLP and thé ONLF. Cynical minds say that thé EPRDF is at this juncture opposed to füll sécession only for as long as their home area Tigray i s not strong enough to stand on its own feet. But it is more likely that thé EPRDF and Président Mêles Zenawi have seen that, apart from domestic problems, thé 'ethnie formula' also has its drawbacks in ternis of international policy in thé Horn. In thé future, small political units may not be strong enough to withstand emerging pressures from neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Kenya, a reconstituted Somalia and perhaps even Egypt (the Blue Nile question). Also, in Ethiopia, in contrast with, for instance, Zaïre, the state is still a coveted resource to capture, as well as an enduring entity forged by 2 000 years of history. In thé group around Président Mêles, there thus may be a new notion of thé potentially central rôle which a politically and economically strong Ethiopia can play in (thé Horn of) Africa. Part of this notion is a minimal-idea of national unity. The core préoccupation dominating their policy is simply not to allow any ethno-hegernonism, especially not of the 'Amhara'. A new 'ethnie state', i.e. one based on ethnie entities, may not have a solid future. Furthermore, if thé EPRDF were to succeed in establishing such a state, under its own largely Tigray leadership, it might well repeat the model of the past (the Shoan 'Amhara' state which it so resented) and undermine its own existence in the long run, because Tigrayans are a numerical minority of approximately 10 per cent of the population. Unifying tendencies -historically speaking, led but not monopolised by the diffuse ethnolinguistic group called Amhara -cannot be denied and fighting them in the form of the Shoan Amhara may prove to be tilting against a windmill.
As for the domestic démocratisation process, it is perhaps true that no African country has as yet found a lasting solution. Ethiopia, which, like any other country on the continent, has its problems, cannot be expected to out-perform the others, despite the fact that the preconditions there are still much better than in most other countries: there is no anti-colonialist inferiority complex, there is a long state tradition with inclusivist éléments, and there is a strong idea of independence, national political identity and pride. The solution must be sought in the development of a new form of 'dual identity': ethno-cultural, and national-political. This would mean that, provided the political and economie conditions for multiple identification are there, representativeness and economie opportunity must lead to new forms of mutual coopération and national cohésion. For this purpose, it would be required that on legal and administrative grounds, ethnicity in itself should have no instrumental advantage. Obviously, this would also imply a reshuffling of the regional boundaries in the long run, and a lifting of all impediments to the free flow of people across regional boundaries, as the 'market' demands, and a de-emphasis of the 'ethnie discourse' in the country. Ho we ver, this is a utopian scenario, and it is unlikely that the present, in formal terms rather 'reactionary', policy will soon be changed. The primacy of politics above éco-nomies is still a dominant principle in Ethiopia. The ethno-political reform policy may also have retarding effects on national and regional economie development. In the African context in général, the dilemma of ethnicisation (rights based on a collective 'identity') or démocratisation (rights based on the individual) demands an imaginative solution. While there are still promising aspects, it is uncertain whether or not Ethiopia can provide such a solution. 
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